The objective of this is to develop a Fuzzy aided Application layer Semantic Intrusion Detection System (FASIDS) which works in the application layer of the network stack. FASIDS consist of semantic IDS and Fuzzy based IDS. Rule based IDS looks for the specific pattern which is defined as malicious. A non-intrusive regular pattern can be malicious if it occurs several times with a short time interval. For detecting such malicious activities, FASIDS is proposed in this paper. At application layer, HTTP traffic's header and payload are analyzed for possible intrusion. In the proposed misuse detection module, the semantic intrusion detection system works on the basis of rules that define various application layer misuses that are found in the network. An attack identified by the IDS is based on a corresponding rule in the rule-base. An event that doesn't make a 'hit' on the rule-base is given to a Fuzzy Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) for further analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring computers or networks for unauthorized entrance, activity, or file modification. Most of the commercially available Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) work in the network layer of the protocol stack. This paves way for attackers to intrude at various other layers, especially in the application layer namely HTTP. Application layer based IDS blocks the application layer based attacks that network layer intrusion detection system can't block. Firewalls works in network layer and prevents the attacks entering the network through unauthorized port. Some complex threats can enter 
ARCHITECTURE OF THE FASIDS
The architecture of the Intrusion Detection System is shown in Figure 1 . The block diagram shows the order in which the different modules process the incoming HTTP traffic. An HTTP sniffer collects the application-layer HTTP traffic from the network. It is a typical proxy server which listens through the network interface by getting requests from the browser and forwarding the same to the service provider. The response obtained from the web server is also captured by the sniffer before being forwarded to the browser. Captured data is then separated into header and payload parts by session dispatcher.
Figure 1 Block diagram view of integrated FASIDS
The Header Analyzer reads the header and prepares a list of the objects in the HTTP packets. Each object represents a field of the HTTP protocol and is a five tuple <message-line, section, feature, operator, content>. This sequence of objects is given to the IDS interpreter that refers to the rule-base and correlates the different objects to trigger one or more rules. BNF grammar for HTTP in the application layer is designed to cater to the needs of semantic intrusion detection. Simultaneously the Payload Analyzer parses the HTML data and searches for misappropriate usage of tags and attributes and also checks for JavaScript based attacks injected in the HTTP (Mogul et al 1999) . The payload analyzer also gives its inputs to the IDS interpreter. 
3.
HTTP RULE-BASE
Header Analyzer
Header Analyzer involves many modules as explained below and depicted in Figure 2 .
HTTP Parser
After receiving the message from the sniffer, the HTTP parser opens the file and processes it as per the sequence of steps enumerated. REQLINE_URI is the state that is acquired when the lexer matches with the attribute string 'URI' before its value is encountered. Interpreter refers rule-base and correlates different objects to trigger one or more rules.
Rule-base
In the rule-base, each object is associated with a rule as explained below.
a. Object
Each occurrence or a match of a simple elementary pattern is associated with an object which is defined as shown in Table 1 . 
Semantic representation of rules
Every time a new vulnerability is identified a new rule has to be written for it and is to be updated in the rule-base. The representation of the rules follows the BNF standard with the non-terminals and the terminals being represented in the rule description as shown below in Figure 3 . 
FUZZY INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM FOR NON-INTRUSIVE PATTERNS
The functional block diagram of fuzzy intrusion detection system is shown in This will evaluate all the rules that trigger and uses a mean of maxima defuzzification method to generate its actual response. 
Fuzzy Associative Mapping by Fuzzy Rules
Fuzzy Associate Mapping (FAM) is used to map fuzzy rules in matrix format. These rules take two variables as input and map it into two dimensional Associative Mapping shown in Table 3 allows us to conclude the rate of false positives for few attacks such as DoS attacks, Brute force attacks. Figure 6 , very low, low, medium, high, very high are functions mapping a time scale.
Figure 6 Fuzzy quantization of trapezoidal-shaped fuzzy numbers
For particular time, the number of login failure is 0.2 (violet color line) and 0.8 (green color line). It is probably fuzzy at many points. At this point, both rules will trigger. It is low or very low depends on the fuzzy rules, which make use of FAM. If it is more "very low" than it is "low", then "very low" rule will generate a stronger response. The program will evaluate all the rules that trigger and use an appropriate defuzzification method to generate its actual response.
For example, the intruder tries to login with several users' passwords and fails. This attack can be identified by observing the number of login failures and the time interval. FCM for Login_failure is shown in Figure 7 .
Figure 7 FCM for Login_failure

Algorithm for Fuzzy Intrusion Detection System
Step 1 : Let x= number of login failures and t= time interval
Step 2 : x=normalization of (x)=(x-min)/(max-min)
where, min is the minimum value for the attribute that x belongs to max is the maximum value for the attribute that x belongs to For each numerical attribute, assign the fuzzy space as shown in Figure 6 Step 3 :
The output of the fuzzification is given to FCM which has the fuzzy rules in the form: IF condition THEN consequent
Suspicious event
Login Failure Interval
Same machine
Condition is a complex fuzzy expression i.e., that uses fuzzy logic operators, which is shown in Table 5.2 Consequent is an atomic Expression 
THEN Intrusion is HP
Step 4 :
Where, x i belongs to X This program will evaluate all the rules that trigger and use a mean of maxima defuzzification method to generate its actual response.
ATTACKS
There are numerous attacks that can be caused using JavaScript. Cross Site Brute force are not detected by a regular misuse detection system. The fuzzy module adds value by detecting these kinds of attacks.
Cross site scripting attack
A web site may unintentionally include malicious HTML tags or scripts in a dynamically generated page based on invalidated input from untrustworthy sources.
This can be a problem when a web server does not adequately ensure that generated pages are properly encoded to prevent unintended execution of scripts, and when input is not validated to prevent malicious HTML from being passed to the user. By cross-site scripting technique it is possible for an attacker to insert malicious script or HTML into a web page. The purpose of cross-site scripting is that an intruder causes a trusted web server to send a page to a victim's browser that contains malicious script or HTML as desired by the intruder. The malicious script runs with the privileges of a trusted script originating from the trusted web server.
SQL injection attack
Many web pages take parameters from a web user and query the database using SQL. Take for instance when a user logins, the web page asks for user name and password and queries the database to check if a user has valid name and password. With SQL Injection, it is possible for an intruder to send crafted user name and/or password field that will modify the SQL query and thus grant him something else.
Denial of service attack
When a server is intentionally overloaded with many requests from an intruder, it causes it to deny normal access to legitimate users. This attack can also be in the form of an infinite loop that gets executed in the client's browser. The malicious scripts are separated and saved in a text file. It can be given as structured input to the yacc code for signature comparison.
Brute force attack
This attack tries all (or a large fraction of all) possible values till the right value are found, also called an exhaustive search. A brute force attack is a method of 
RESULTS
A graph is plotted for the average time taken for scanning a single http request (Response time) versus the number of objects that were incorporated in the IDS interpreter. As the number of objects increase, the number of ways in which the text can be matched increases and hence the time taken also increases. From Figure   8 it can be inferred that the response time increases linearly and then begins to saturate as the number of objects to be matched increases. When the number of objects increases beyond 80, the response time increase at a very slow rate. Hence the implemented IDS perform well when the number of objects is more than 80.
Figure 8 Performance analysis chart
The objects in each of the protocol field that are to be searched are plotted in Figure 9 . It is observed that if the number of objects to be matched in each protocol field is increasing the Response time increases linearly. But the response time tends to saturate after a specific number of rules. This is because it is expected that the rules contain some common objects which are to be checked once thus improving the response time. 
Figure 10 Performance analyses for payload
A graph is plotted for the average time taken for analyzing a html file, (Processing time) versus the payload size as shown in Figure 10 . As the payload size increases, the amount of the text that needs to be matched increases, and so the processing time also increases. Figure 11 shows the detection rate with various components of IDS. From the Figure   6 .8, the detection rate increases by combining HTTP header and payload (HTML and Scripts). Figure 6 shows the detection rate of fuzzy based misuse detection is high when compared to the regular misuse detection for some attacks such as Dos, brute force, Directory Traversal attacks. 
Figure 11 Detection Ratio with various components of IDS
